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RON COLLINS: Welcome.  My name is Ron Collins.  It is a plea-
sure and an honor to return to yet another Seattle University program and 
participate as your moderator for the panel entitled, “The Problem of 
Judicial Campaign Arm Races: What Can be Done in State Legislatures 
and State Courts?” 
I would like to join the chorus of others in thanking Seattle Univer-
sity Law School and Dean Annette Clark for making this event possible.  
Thank you as well to some remarkable people who played a vital role in 
shaping this conference.  I refer first and foremost to Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, who continues to champion the cause of ethical and meaning-
ful judicial independence.  In addition, I would like to thank Seattle Uni-
versity’s former Dean, Kellye Testy, as well as Professor Sally Rider and 
Mary McQueen.  All of these women have played a very significant role 
in making this event possible, and I feel happy and honored to recognize 
their work today.  And finally, a heartfelt thank you to my friend and 
colleague David Skover for doing a truly remarkable job in making this 
event both possible and successful during the most trying of times. 
Let me begin our discussion with a few thoughts from two cham-
pions of realism.  First, the infamous political philosopher Niccolò Ma-
chiavelli once said that others will tell you what the world should be, but 
he will tell you what it is.  This realistic perspective will be the lens 
through which this discussion on this panel will follow. 
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The next realist is a former West Virginia supreme court justice 
who shall remain unnamed.  Many years ago, when my hair was still 
thick, this justice spoke at a conference on state court judicial elections.  
I was not there, but the story goes that when it came to an audience ques-
tion, an idealistic young man asked this West Virginia supreme court 
justice: How do you go about becoming a state supreme court justice?  
Do you have to go to a good law school?  Do you have to become in-
volved in the state bar association?  Do you have to become involved in 
civic organizations?  Do you have to become a trial judge, then an appel-
late judge, and then tender your resume to the governor and hope that 
merit is the measure?  Is that how you have to do it? 
Without pausing for an ethical second, the bold justice from West 
Virginia said, “Money, my man, money.”  This is the realist backdrop or 
subtext for much of the discussion about Caperton1 and also White.2  At 
least some of the subtext includes an animosity to judicial elections and 
an attempt to defang them. 
We do not like our current method of doing things, and we are more 
than willing to do whatever we can do to remove the negative aspects of 
the electoral process from the judicial selection process.  We will discuss 
whether and to what extent the process is a good or bad approach.  We 
have before us a group of people, judges, and lawmakers alike, who have 
all been tested by the flames of contested elections.  In fact, one speaker 
has been tested five times. Incredibly, many, if not all, of these people 
who have been tested by the flames of contested judicial elections vigo-
rously support judicial elections.  Today, we will hear their views. 
Let me introduce our guests.  First, Chief Justice Shirley Abraham-
son from the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  Next, the man I had the honor 
to work for many years ago, now retired Justice Hans Linde from the 
Oregon Supreme Court.  To my left is Charlie Wiggins, who has served 
as a judge, has run in a contested election, is a prominent lawyer in the 
field of judicial elections, and is a man whose knowledge of this subject 
humbles at least this moderator. 
We also have another former Linde law clerk, my friend David 
Schuman.  He now sits on the Oregon Court of Appeals.  And finally, I 
would like to introduce Representative Jamie Pedersen, who brings the 
legislative perspective with him.  He serves in the Washington State 
House of Representatives and is involved in matters related to the judi-
ciary and judicial oversight. 
                                                            
 1. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, (2009). 
 2. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
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We hope to engage in an uninhibited, robust, and open discussion 
about a variety of issues.  In order to move this discussion along, I will 
ask questions directed to a particular panelist, ask that panelist to take the 
lead in responding, and then encourage the other panelists to respond 
accordingly to ensure a lively and illuminating discussion. 
Let me turn to Chief Justice Abrahamson first.  When one reads 
some of the United States Supreme Court opinions in this area, it is easy 
to get the sense that some of the Justices want states to let their judicial 
systems go to hell in a hand basket if they so choose?  With that, how do 
you feel about state judicial elections: good, bad, or indifferent? 
SHIRLEY ABRAHAMSON: Wisconsin has utilized judicial elec-
tions since it became a state in the populist era of 1848.  I originally 
came to the bench by Governor Patrick Lucey’s appointment without any 
commission.  He selected me rather than others on the basis of merit.  
And I have proven him correct.  I have stood for four contested elections, 
each for a ten-year term.  In Wisconsin, judicial elections are in April 
rather than during partisan elections in November.  Unless there is some-
thing special on the April ballot like a presidential primary, the turnout is 
usually roughly twenty percent of the electorate.  However, the polls 
show that in Wisconsin, the people are unwilling to give up the opportu-
nity to vote.  This does not mean that public opinion will not change—it 
might—but this is the current situation.  I favor elections in Wisconsin; 
however, I am unwilling to say whether I favor elections in different 
states with different legal or political cultures.  This is a state decision, 
determined by the legislature and, usually, by the constitution. 
The states are laboratories for methods of judicial selection.  Many 
states have elected judges.  Bert Brandenburg’s statistics and figures are 
generally given, showing that 85% or so of state judges of different le-
vels across the country are subject to some kind of election, including 
elections for retention or selection, and elections that are partisan or non-
partisan.  According to Caperton, at least thirty-nine states have elected 
judges at some level in the justice system.  State courts handle up to 98% 
of all the judicial business in this country.  When we talk about the elec-
tion system for state court judges, we are talking about judges who han-
dle most of the cases in this country.  Thus, determining the most effec-
tive method for judicial selection is an important decision. 
Originally, many viewed the implementation of judicial elections as 
an improvement over states whose party bosses or legislative leadership 
selected the judges.  In the states that did not have judicial elections, 
judges were appointed not necessarily on the basis of merit, but on non-
merit based considerations.  The people felt that the opportunity to select 
or retain judges through elections was an important reform. 
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The issue we face today is whether this reform needs further ad-
justment.  There is no perfect method of selecting judges.  Despite how it 
may look on paper, a system for selecting judges may prove imperfect in 
operation.  The selection method may be captured by particular elements, 
or it simply may not function very well.  The personal views of the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court Justices about judicial elections should not in-
fluence a state’s decision on the best judicial selection method for that 
state.  What the Justices do or do not like is irrelevant because they are 
not supposed to decide constitutional issues on the basis of what they 
think is good policy. 
In an elective system, a lot of information is on the table, open to 
public view.  In appointive systems, much information about the selec-
tion may be under the table where people cannot see it or gauge it.  I 
hope that we will not refer to appointive systems as merit selection be-
cause we get judges with merit by election, as well as appointment. 
I leave you with one thought: in an appointive system, like the fed-
eral system, there are lobbying groups that go see senators and that con-
sult with the President about which judges should have the consent of the 
Senate.  Paid ads may line the Capital Beltway, which we outside the 
Beltway don’t see saying, “Call your senator and tell him to or tell her to 
. . . .”  Why is the appointive system, as it relates to money and interest 
groups, any different from the elective system?  Why is a confirmation 
hearing different from an election with regard to free speech?  The issues 
that arise in the elective system seem also to arise in the appointive sys-
tem where a hundred senators consent to somebody to serve as judge for 
life.  My term of office is only ten years, and don’t count me out for 
2019. 
RON COLLINS: Chief Justice, nobody’s counting you out for any-
thing.  Chief Justice Abrahamson just spoke about the difference be-
tween appointed judges and elected judges.  Let me ask David Schuman 
to put a tail on that kite.  Who cares about state judicial elections?  Why 
do they think elections are important? 
DAVID SCHUMAN: The first question to ask is, “Who does not 
care?”  As Professor Richard Hasen said earlier today, the general public 
does not care.  I think they care about their right to vote as an abstract 
matter, but they do not particularly care about voting in a judicial elec-
tion.  I have not done independent research on that subject, but my friend 
Professor Nicholas Lovrich, an expert from Washington State University 
who has done that research, agreed with my impression over a drink last 
night, which passes as a literature review.  The general public’s lack of 
interest in judicial elections magnifies the effect of money in judicial 
elections.  People with money have the ability to advertise on television 
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and can build or create a knowledge base instead of trying to change an 
existing one, which is much more difficult. 
As for people who are interested in judicial elections, I think that 
there are three categories.  The first group consists of directly interested 
individuals.  The second group is made up of what I call reactive interest 
groups.  Finally, there are general, permanent interest groups.  I believe 
that none of the actions of the three interest categories actually leads to a 
positive impact on judicial elections. 
The directly interested individuals include, first and foremost, sit-
ting judges.  Justice Otto Kaus once referred to the prospect of an up-
coming judicial election and the effect that it has on a sitting judge as the 
proverbial alligator in the bathtub.  You know that it’s there and that it’s 
dangerous, but you try to ignore it.  Another kind of directly interested 
individual is someone who is highly qualified and interested in applying 
for judicial office.  For this person, the prospect of a brutal and expensive 
judicial election serves as a powerful disincentive.  Then there are the 
potential appointees who have no qualifications.  Instead, they have 
access to money, name familiarity, a sputtering career, a grudge, or some 
combination.  Justice Linde refers to these people as self-starters.  And 
then, of course, there are the rare individuals who have pending cases.  
Although one particular case has been influential, this situation strikes 
me as extremely rare. 
The second category, the reactive interest groups, might get in-
volved in judicial elections for several reasons.  They might engage in 
judicial elections because of some recent high-profile, unpopular deci-
sion by a court or a named justice.  They may be interested in a case that 
is coming up for a constitutional test before a particular court.  They also 
might get involved because of some recent legislation. 
During my contested election, I faced opposition from the final 
group—the permanent interest groups.  The permanent players, the fre-
quent flyers in our system, include the plaintiff’s lawyers, the defense 
bar, the chamber of commerce, and interestingly, law enforcement and 
anticrime groups.  The anticrime groups typically do not have access to a 
lot of money, so they tend to piggyback on the other permanent groups. 
RON COLLINS: Judge Schuman, some might interpret what you 
say as, for lack of a better phrase, a progressive critique of judicial elec-
tions.  Yet, if my memory serves me correctly, the idea of judicial elec-
tions was brought to us by people like Josephine Goldmark and Florence 
Kelley, two women who kept the company of Louis Brandeis.  They 
sought judicial elections as a component of a whole progressive reform 
movement.  Have we reached the point now where judicial elections are 
contrary to that progressive ethos or ideal? 
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DAVID SCHUMAN: Judicial elections have become problematic 
with regard to this ideal due to modern campaign techniques and the ad-
vent of big money in judicial elections.  I agree wholeheartedly with 
Chief Justice Abrahamson’s sense that an appointive system is, in many 
ways, no less politicized under many circumstances.  However, states 
could institute other alternatives that would address the abuses that judi-
cial elections were brought into our constitutional system to combat, in-
cluding the undue influence of particular interest groups.  One such al-
ternative might be a commission system where people are nominated by 
supposedly disinterested experts. 
HANS LINDE: I want to go back a step and tell you a little bit 
more about the West Virginia judge to whom Ron Collins referred.  His 
name is Richard Neely, and I knew him years ago.  He is a highly edu-
cated person—a private school product out of New England who went to 
Yale Law School and did well.  Richard Neely’s grandfather was a Unit-
ed States Senator from West Virginia, and the family name was famous.  
His grandfather had been elected at least as often as Chief Justice Shirley 
Abrahamson, I believe, but for six-year terms instead of ten.  After he 
was elected to the West Virginia State Legislature, Richard Neely consi-
dered running for the United States Senate and began raising money.  
The incumbent, who had previously indicated that he intended to retire, 
decided to run for office again, and Richard Neely suddenly found him-
self running against a highly organized and well-funded campaign.  Ri-
chard Neely, who had already collected campaign funds and had a well-
known name, responded by thinking, “What else could I run for?”  He 
decided to run for the West Virginia Supreme Court, and of course, he 
won with no trouble.  I share Justice Abrahamson’s interest in making it 
clear that an appointive system does not guarantee merit and an elective 
system does not exclude it. 
We can only judge these judicial selection systems from the pers-
pective of our own states.  Justice Abrahamson was very careful to speak 
of Wisconsin, and I quite agree that it is important to be aware of the po-
litical background and the culture of that particular state and also the 
concerns of people in that state. 
My perspective comes from the judicial selection process in Ore-
gon.  Oregon, being a much, much older state than Washington, of 
course, became a state in 1859.  From the beginning, the Oregon State 
Constitution provided for the election of judges.  This was not a progres-
sive reform in the modern sense; it was reform that related back to the 
Jacksonian Era.  For seventy years, Oregon held partisan judicial elec-
tions, and so you have to ask yourselves: Is there something incongruous 
about the idea that a party nominates people for judge?  Would anybody 
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today adopt a system involving partisan elections for judges?  I would 
think not, especially if they didn’t have it already.  Indeed, Oregon got 
rid of partisan judicial elections in 1931. 
But, why does the party label make a difference when the same 
kind of competition arises in nonpartisan judicial elections?  We think 
the partisan system is incongruous with judicial elections because candi-
dates who put on a jersey that says, “I’m a Democrat” or “I’m a Republi-
can,” cannot and should not talk about the differences between the two 
parties or make any promises as a result of their political affiliation.  This 
obviously is a contradiction, and it was perfectly understandable that 
Oregon eventually got rid of it. 
One important point that is often left out of these discussions is that 
judicial elections usually concern the appellate judges.  In contested ap-
pellate races, candidates likely will be caricatured either as a liberal ac-
tivist or a conservative status-quo troglodyte; candidates may choose one 
side or the other.  You also face those four-to-three or five-to-four deci-
sions along predictable lines, so it is not surprising if voters start to think 
of judges just as counters in this higher level of lawmaking activity.  We 
should at least realize that we are dealing with two different types of 
questions and two different types of judging: trial and appellate.  None of 
the five-to-four voting lines apply to trial judges or to the interests of 
people who care about their trial judges.  Trial judges deal with people in 
the courtroom, the real human beings.  Appellate judges don’t see the 
clients; they see lawyers.  It is useful to keep in mind that we don’t nec-
essarily have a one-size-fits-all set of considerations when considering an 
ideal judicial selection system. 
CHARLIE WIGGINS: I would like to give the Washington State 
perspective after hearing about Wisconsin and Oregon.  Although, as 
Judge Linde says, Oregon is an older state than Washington, this is be-
cause Washington took leave of Oregon when Oregon became a state.  
Washington became a territory in 1853, and for the next thirty-six years, 
the President of the United States appointed the judges to the Washing-
ton Territorial Supreme Court, primarily for political reasons.  By 1889, 
the year of our state constitutional convention, the people of the territory 
grew tired of appointed judges—political supporters of the President that 
moved to Washington territory upon appointment.  Some were great 
judges, and others were not.  The attitude of the population was best ex-
pressed by William Lair Hill in an article in the Portland Oregonian 
when the convention began.  He recounted the following exchange: A 
lawyer was talking to a well-informed citizen about the idea that ap-
pointed judges might be better than elected judges because the Governor 
would have the opportunity to study the problem and would naturally 
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pick the better person.  The citizen responded, “Well that may be, but 
this is a democracy, and the people of the coming State of Washington 
are not going to have better judges forced upon them than they really 
want.”  And so we elect our judges in Washington. 
RON COLLINS: In a previous session, panelists raised many in-
sightful comments about Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Caperton.  Kath-
leen Sullivan spoke of various limitations on independent campaign ex-
penditures.  Professor Andrew Siegel responded that, given Justice Ken-
nedy’s fidelity to First Amendment principles, at least in terms of the 
voting record, Justice Kennedy might be hesitant to endorse ex ante ap-
proaches in this area.  How does Justice Kennedy’s opinion impact influ-
ence decisionmaking concerning judicial selection? 
CHARLIE WIGGINS: What struck me about the Caperton opinion 
is that Justice Kennedy concludes the opinion with an invitation to the 
states.  He basically says, “We’re not going to have any more Caperton’s 
coming up here; the states are going to take care of this.”  States have 
their judicial codes, and this raises the following question: How are the 
states reacting to Caperton?  The American Bar Association proposed a 
complete revision of the Code of Judicial Conduct in 2007.  As a result, 
about thirty-five jurisdictions are actively considering what parts of the 
new code to enact.  The ABA recommended a recusal rule based on the 
level of campaign contributions and financial support to the judge’s 
campaign.  Under the ABA model, the judge should recuse herself if a 
lawyer or a litigant has given more than a designated amount to the 
judge’s campaign. 
The responses have been interesting because, of the states that have 
looked at this issue, only about five have either adopted or have a rec-
ommendation before them to adopt a recusal rule based on the ABA’s 
revisions.  Of those five jurisdictions, Arizona is the only state that ac-
tually adopted a recusal rule.  Interestingly enough, Arizona appoints 
judges by recommendations from a commission, rather than by election.  
Four other states have task forces that have recommended rules that will 
include a recusal rule, and I’m pleased to say that Washington is among 
them.  Eleven states either have adopted or have a recommendation be-
fore their state supreme court to adopt a version of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct with no recusal rule, even in the aftermath of Caperton.  This is 
not an overwhelming reaction from the states. 
In the face of this underwhelming response from the majority of 
states, the Washington proposal raises important issues that illustrate the 
need to modify any recusal rule to the needs of the particular jurisdiction.  
The first issue to address is what money to consider as financial support 
for the judge.  The ABA recommends that financial support should in-
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clude (1) direct contributions to the judge’s campaign, (2) independent 
expenditures, and (3) any money given to an independent political action 
committee (PAC) or 527 organizations with the understanding that it will 
be spent to support the judge’s election campaign.  This third prong 
creates a tough standard because of the difficultly in detecting earmark-
ing of that sort.  Similarly, the Washington recommendation sweeps eve-
rything into one pile.  If the Washington recommendation was applied to 
the Caperton case, direct contributions would be only $1000, indepen-
dent expenditures would be a half-million dollars, and the money given 
to a PAC or independent organization that supported the judge’s cam-
paign would be $2.5 million. 
After the money is combined, the next issue to arise is how high to 
set the bar at which a judge should recuse herself?  The original Wash-
ington recommendation set the bar at the state contribution limit—
$1600—a figure that is periodically readjusted.  After debate and lobby-
ing, the task force recommended a bar at ten times the state contribution 
limit—$16,000 in the primary election and $16,000 if the race goes into 
the general. 
The final issue to consider is whether the party who contributes to a 
judge’s campaign can then attempt to prevent the judge from hearing the 
same party’s case.  Under the Washington proposal, a motion to recuse 
could be made only by the party on the opposing side.  Thus, a party 
could not preemptively give money in order to remove a judge from a 
case because the opposing side must file the motion and will do so only 
if she genuinely believes the judge is biased due to the contribution.  The 
Washington proposal will be considered by the Washington Supreme 
Court.  Similar proposals will appear in other states as well. 
SHIRLEY ABRAHAMSON: Indeed, the states will be faced with 
proposals for recusal.  With more money in campaigns, recusal takes on 
added significance.  In Wisconsin, we have two petitions pending, and I 
would not be surprised if more are filed.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
will hear the two pending petitions in open conference in October.  Any-
one who wants to come to the hearing may come, and people can send 
emails or letters in favor of or opposed to the petitions, or they can sug-
gest amendments. 
The first petition, presented by the League of Women Voters, sets a 
contribution limit of $1,000 for a party, lawyer, or law firm representing 
the party, which is similar to an ABA proposal.  In Wisconsin, the legis-
lative limit for contributions is currently $10,000.  The second petition 
comes from the Wisconsin Realtors Association.  This association wants 
a rule that does not allow a contribution, in and of itself, to warrant re-
cusal.  I assume that a contribution would be just one factor to consider.  
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The court will discuss both petitions and may render a decision as to 
which they will accept, if any.3 
As states consider reforming their judicial selection process, they 
will be faced with these kinds of difficult questions about recusal.  Fur-
thermore, many proposals include waiver provisions allowing both par-
ties to waive the right to move for recusal.  Waiver raises the question 
whether a judge may recuse herself, in spite of a waiver from both par-
ties, if she sees fit. 
RON COLLINS: Before we get to further discussion of the particu-
lars, I would like to bring in the institutional perspective of Representa-
tive Pedersen.  Undoubtedly, you and your colleagues on the judiciary 
committee were busy reading the Caperton opinion on June 8, 2009.  
From the vantage point of a state lawmaker, why would you and your 
colleagues have any interest in state judicial elections?  Why does this 
matter even concern you? 
JAMIE PEDERSEN: I think it is useful to give some of the recent 
history of judicial elections in Washington.  Some interest groups made 
fairly blatant attempts to buy seats on the Washington Supreme Court.  
In at least one instance, an interest group succeeded.  This provides the 
context to understand why this is an issue that’s important to the judi-
ciary committee, in particular, and to the legislature in general. 
In the 2002 election cycle, the Building Industry Association of 
Washington put forward a supreme court justice candidate, who ended 
up losing in a very close election—50.12% to 49.88%.  The candidate 
lost even though he outspent his opponent three to one; the candidate 
spent $411,000, while the opponent spent $143,000.  The same candidate 
ran again two years later with even more money, outspending his oppo-
nent $539,418 to $155,233.  The candidate wound up beating his oppo-
nent, even though he had never served in the judicial branch.  His oppo-
nent, on the other hand, was a longtime and very well qualified court of 
appeals judge in Division One  of the Washington Court of Appeals.  He 
beat her fairly narrowly—52% to 48%.  Seventy-two percent of the mon-
ey that he spent in his campaign came from the Building Industries As-
sociation of Washington, which represents small contractors and their 
allies. 
In 2006, the legislature responded to this phenomenon by passing 
contribution limits on judicial campaigns for the first time.  Up to that 
point, Washington was one of four or five states in the country that did 
                                                            
 3. Additional recusal petitions were filed.  The Court decided by a 4-3 vote to adopt nearly 
verbatim and without further study the rule proposed by the Wisconsin Realtors Association and 
Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce. 
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not have any contribution limits in judicial elections.  We imposed the 
same contribution limits that apply to other candidates for statewide of-
fice.  As Mr. Wiggins mentioned, the limit initially was $1400 and has 
since been raised to $1600 per person per election. 
Following the imposition of contribution limits, we had not only an 
increase in campaign contributions, but also a dramatic increase in inde-
pendent expenditures in our state.  For example, our chief justice, who 
raised $267,000 personally, and received another $379,000 in indepen-
dent expenditures, ran against a fellow with $433,000 in direct contribu-
tions and $1.65 million in independent expenditures.  The chief justice 
ended up winning 54% to 45% in the primary.  Another justice, who was 
taken on by the same coalition, raised $289,000 personally and received 
another $317,000 in independent expenditures.  She faced an opponent 
who raised $344,000 and received $709,000 in independent expendi-
tures—outspending the incumbent by about five to three.  The challenger 
ended up losing in the general election. 
I think it is fair to say that the legislature was alarmed by this influx 
of money and looked for ways, consistent with the constitutional protec-
tions on independent expenditures, to try to protect the independence of 
the judiciary.  The legislature’s concern pertained almost exclusively to 
the supreme court elections.  In Washington, well over 70% of superior 
court judges start out by appointment and wind up unopposed on the bal-
lot when their position comes up for election.  King County has fifty-
three judicial spots in any given year.  Usually, only four or five of those 
positions are contested.  By and large, the superior court level already 
has a system with both appointment and retention elections. 
RON COLLINS: One might say that this is all well and fine, even 
noble.  And yet, when you mentioned that the information about the lop-
sided nature of money contributions in these elections caused alarm 
among some of your colleagues, I was reminded of that famous scene in 
Casablanca where Captain Renault says, “I’m shocked, shocked to find 
that gambling is going on here!”  Assume someone presents a lumber 
initiative to cut all the trees, and interest groups in support of this initia-
tive give hundreds of thousands of dollars, even millions of dollars, to 
ensure that you get elected; you are their man.  Why do you, as a state 
lawmaker, feel comfortable with and not corrupted by receiving that 
money, but when a judge gets the same kinds of contributions, you want 
to place limitations?  Why is it noble for a lawmaker to accept such 
funds, but ignoble for a judge?  In other words, if someone that gives 
both a lawmaker and a judge a lot of money, is that the proverbial alliga-
tor in the bathtub? 
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JAMIE PEDERSEN: We have an expectation that the political 
branches of government are, and should be, a part of that tug-and-pull.  
At some level, large movements of political opinion can be shaped by 
spending on campaigns and by the reaction to such campaigns.  It is the 
prerogative of the people to change that political direction. 
RON COLLINS: So a politician can be their man for all legislative 
matters, but when it comes to judicial elections, candidates should not be 
persuaded by what they want.  Judges cannot be their man, is that right? 
JAMIE PEDERSEN: We expect judges to rise above that tug-and-
pull, to have a certain amount of allegiance to the constitution and its 
core enduring principles.  In the 2007 session, two bills concerning the 
judicial selection process came forward in Washington State.  One bill 
addressed the public funding of judicial elections.4  It got a hearing in the 
state government and tribal affairs committee, but it did not pass out of 
the committee.  The second bill came to the judiciary committee.  It 
would have changed Washington’s judicial selection process to a system 
with appointment and retention elections.  Under the bill, a nominating 
commission would recommend appointees.  This billed passed out of the 
judiciary committee, but it did not make it out of the rules committee. 
Furthermore, Washington will not likely see a constitutional 
amendment addressing judicial elections.  One of the major ways Wash-
ington differed from Oregon when it became a state was its process for 
amending the constitution.  In Oregon, constitutional amendments are as 
easy as initiatives; it just takes enough signatures on petitions followed 
by a majority vote of the people.  The constitutional amendment process 
in Washington requires a two-thirds majority vote in both houses fol-
lowed by a vote of the people.  The political reality in Washington is that 
on any controversial subject, whether it’s about electing judges or about 
having a state income tax, there is no possibility of amending the consti-
tution.  People who are interested in making that formal change in Wash-
ington are just out of luck for the foreseeable future. 
In 2008, Washington had a much less controversial judicial election 
cycle; all three incumbents were reelected, and candidates spent dramati-
cally less money.  The jury is still out, as they say, on whether this un-
controversial cycle was because the Building Industry Association of 
Washington spent most of its money on the highly contested guberna-
torial election, because the association decided the money was not well 
spent in previous cycle, or because of both. 
                                                            
 4. H.B. 1186, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007). 
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During the 2009 session, the public funding of judicial elections bill 
returned, but our state’s priorities were brought into rather sharp focus 
due to the economic and budget crises.  We seriously considered cutting 
money for the Office of Civil Legal Aid or the Office of Public Defense, 
for interpretation services, and for the state law library.  Moreover, we 
were unable to advance a proposal for legal representation of children in 
dependency proceedings.  Under these circumstances, I question the rela-
tive importance of shifting a function that is privately funded, namely 
judicial campaigns, to the public sector, given that so many important 
interests are competing for scarce resources in the state budget. 
I would like to contrast spending on political campaigns and judi-
cial campaigns.  I represent the forty-third legislative district; Washing-
ton has forty-nine legislative districts.  I happen to have two of the three 
law schools in the state in my district, which is geographically part of 
central Seattle.  My 2006 campaign, which was my first, was highly con-
tested.  Six Democrats, a Progressive, and a Republican ran for the posi-
tion.  I spent just over $180,000 in the campaign, trying to educate voters 
about who I was and to convince them that I was the right person for the 
job.  To contrast, look back to the figures I gave earlier about the highly 
qualified court of appeals judge with a constituency forty-nine times 
larger than my legislative district who lost to an opponent backed by the 
Building Association of Washington.  She spent $25,000 less than I did 
on my campaign.  If the public elects judges, part of the problem may not 
be that there is too much money involved.  Rather, there is too little 
money involved for judicial campaigns to penetrate the public con-
sciousness, for voters to have any understanding about the judicial can-
didates and their qualifications. 
Finally, Washington is unusual because it has a nine person su-
preme court.  Only five states in this country have nine justices on their 
supreme courts.  Many states have seven justices, and quite a few that 
have five as well.  One thing that other states looking at this problem 
might consider is whether increasing the number of justices on a state 
supreme court makes it less likely that those seats can be purchased in an 
election. 
RON COLLINS: If special interests sometimes pollute the electoral 
waters, at least with judiciaries, does this influence carry over to state 
lawmakers, making it difficult for state lawmakers to pass rules or laws 
in this area?  The splendor of what Representative Pedersen discussed is 
that interest groups do not necessarily have to go to state lawmakers to 
exert influence.  But let me offer an additional consideration: Judge 
Linde, what role, if any, might Congress play in this area that is consis-
tent with principles of federalism? 
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HANS LINDE: The title of the program for this conference says 
that judicial selection is a national concern.  If it is a national concern, we 
can recognize a number of things that could be done.  But I am not so 
sure that most people think selection of state judges is high on the na-
tional agenda.  One reason for the lack of concern is because major fi-
nancial activities, industries, and law firms now go to federal courts ra-
ther than state courts.  The state courts are left to fend for themselves 
without any great harm to the nation as long as the United States Su-
preme Court can make sure that they do not violate individual rights.  
Why would the power players in our nation worry about these state 
judges? 
Furthermore, what could Congress do to address the concerns 
raised in this conference?  One option is to publicize the issue through 
congressional hearings.  For example, an interested member of the Se-
nate Judiciary Committee could simply do what Sam Ervin did back in 
the Watergate times: conduct a hearing to expose what is going on and 
emphasize why the need for reform is this important. 
Another option, which is more direct yet harder to pass, is that 
Congress could simply provide a modest amount of money to upgrade 
the salaries of state judges as long as they meet certain criteria.  One cri-
terion could be that the judges are, in fact, elected or selected on a non-
partisan, merit, or qualifications basis.  This criterion could be designed 
to disfavor people who, for whatever reason, think they can get elected 
without proper qualifications.  I do not foresee this happening. 
SHIRLEY ABRAHAMSON: To expand on Hans Linde’s last 
point, I would like to share a bit of history.  Chief Justice Burger was 
very interested in the state courts and believed that the state courts should 
be of very high caliber to encourage people to go to the state courts as 
well as the federal courts.  He worried that if the people, namely the law-
yers and litigants, did not trust the state courts, then more business would 
go to the federal courts and a whole series of problems would arise.  
Chief Justice Burger was very influential in laying the groundwork for 
the National Center for State Courts to assist state courts in various re-
search facilities and to assist in making the state court judges equal in 
competence and quality with the federal courts, preventing litigants from 
selecting one court or the other on the basis of the judge quality.  The 
National Center for State Courts, which is one of the sponsors for this 
program, has played that role for many a year.  Of course, many federal 
judges have been state court judges prior to appointment, so one wonders 
if the appointment process imbues mystical abilities to the same person.  
Hans Linde’s point that the state courts should be run efficiently and ef-
fectively with well compensated judges is a very important one.  Con-
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gress has assisted the state courts with funds for research, drug courts, 
and technical assistance.  Further, there is a bill before Congress to pro-
vide funding for interpreters in the state courts.  On the other hand, state 
courts do much that federal courts could learn from as well. 
CHARLIE WIGGINS: I would like to go back to a good point that 
Jamie Pedersen mentioned—that is, whether society needs more money 
in these races, not less money.  Certainly, a few hundred thousand dollars 
will not educate the voters about the qualifications in a statewide race.  
The paradox of this situation: more money spent in these races does not 
necessarily ensure better information.  We get terrible television advertis-
ing—campaigns that avoid hard information and deal in emotional reac-
tion and responses.  Such advertising is a tremendous problem with the 
money question in our elections.  Instead, those concerned with reform-
ing the judicial selection process want to provide voters with more in-
formation and better information that will allow them to exercise their 
vote intelligently. 
We ought to think about voter education because we do not teach 
people how to vote in our schools.  We should send friends, relatives, 
camp followers, and other voters to www.votingforjudges.org.  This im-
partial website has a huge amount of information, and its voter’s pamph-
let is very helpful.  Furthermore, it does not contain too much informa-
tion, promoting better flow of good information.  When massive amounts 
of money come in to an election, horrendous television campaigns ap-
pear causing major impediments to voter education. This problem also 
relates to the need for a reformed recusal rule, an important piece of this 
conversation. 
HANS LINDE: I absolutely agree that the need to reform the recus-
al process is necessary; this has been argued for years.  Oregon has a dif-
ferent rule from the ABA.  We created our rule many years ago with a 
free speech perspective and individual rights in mind.  But the image of 
campaigns is changing in front of our eyes to that of the great television 
campaigns.  Also, we used to have newspaper ads, but now anyone who 
is mad at a sitting judge can raise enough money to send direct mail to 
voters. 
Young people ought to be thinking, “What do I do if I want to run 
for election some day?  That stuff gets thrown away; nobody pays much 
attention to it.  The content doesn’t amount to anything.  How do you 
campaign nowadays?”  What if a membership organization of some kind 
creates a website and uses social networks, like Facebook, and other 
modern technology that I myself do not know because I am much too old 
to do any of that.  The idea of limiting how people campaign would fail 
because there is no clear way to limit campaign techniques consistent 
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with the free speech provisions or with the technological reality that has 
changed the campaign methods people use.  However, Oregon does pub-
lish a voter’s pamphlet that is undoubtedly more helpful in judicial elec-
tions than in many other elections because it tells voters which candi-
dates have a qualified background and which candidates are unemployed, 
painting houses, or have famous names but no experience. 
To be realistic about judicial elections, we have to get down from 
the supreme court level, which is a different kind of ballgame.  We could 
talk about why people want to run for this office.  Oregon judges are low 
paid judges by national standards, which does not help select or keep 
qualified judges. Now if a state raises the judges' salaries, as it should, 
without changing the selection system, then the problems may get worse.  
The job will become attractive to more people who can get elected, and 
who begin to think that this is a pretty good gig. 
RON COLLINS: Now if there are house painters who would like to 
run for the state supreme court or others who would like to ask a ques-
tion, please come up to the microphones on the right or the left, we wel-
come your questions. 
